Sunday, December 16, 2012

3rd Linguistic Conference for Doctoral Students: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Language, Discourse, and Culture, Heidelberg, April 5-6 2013

The 3rd Linguistic Conference for Doctoral Students will take place at Heidelberg University, Germany from 05.-06. April 2013. The overarching topic of the conference will be: "Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Language, Discourse, and Culture." The deadline for submissions is 15 February:

3rd Linguistic Conference for Doctoral Students: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Language, Discourse, and Culture
Universität Heidelberg, April 5th and 6th, 2013
We cordially invite you to the 3rd Linguistic Conference for Doctoral Students (“Sprachwissenschaftliche Tagung für Promotionsstudierende”, STaPs), which will be held on April 5th and 6th, 2013 at Heidelberg University. The overarching topic of the conference will be
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Language, Discourse, and Culture.
We warmly invite doctoral students at all stages in their graduate work and of every linguistic field and discipline to present their projects and to exchange ideas and network with other doctoral students.
Additionally, the 3rd STaPs is explicitly directed towards interested doctoral students in all other areas of the humanities, social sciences, and cultural sciences who would like to discuss the role of language, discourse, and culture in their doctoral projects in an interdisciplinary setting.
The conference provides doctoral students the opportunity to present specific aspects or current challenges within their projects in problem-oriented talks that leave a substantial amount of room for discussion. This allows students to discuss difficulties and develop strategies to solve these problems in an informal and interdisciplinary environment. In addition, the program will include interactive and interdisciplinary workshops on methodological and general questions regarding doctoral projects in the areas of language, discourse, and culture.
The 3rd StaPs offers doctoral students the possibility to share their experiences with other young researchers from a wide range of disciplines and receive feedback on their work from peers. In contrast to other academic conferences, participants do not need to present finished products. Instead, students can share and discuss work in progress and challenges in their doctoral project in a pressure-free environment.
Empirically-oriented and theoretically-oriented projects are equally welcome. Moreover, we warmly welcome participants who would like to exchange ideas and network with other doctoral students, but do not wish to give a talk.
In order to submit abstracts for talks (20 minute talk + 20 minute discussion) or workshops (60 minutes) as well as register as a participant, please send an email with the abstract attached to:  
The conference languages are German and English.
Deadline for Abstracts (German or English, max. 350 words): 15.02.2013
Deadline for Conference Registration: 15.03.2013
More Info at:

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Jim Hurford: What is wrong, and what is right, about current theories of language, in the light of evolution?

As I mentioned in my previous post, the 2012 Poznań Linguistic Meeting (PLM) features a thematic section on “Theory and evidence in language evolution research.” This section's invited speaker was Jim Hurford, who is Emeritus Professor at Edinburgh University. Hurford is a very eminent figure in language evolution research and has published two very influential and substantive volumes on “Language in the Light of Evolution”: The Origins of Meaning (2007) and The Origins of Grammar (2011). In his Talk, Hurford asked “What is wrong, and what is right, about current theories of language, in the light of evolution?” (you can find the abstract here). Hurford presented two extreme positions on the evolution of language (which nevertheless are advocated by quite a number of evolutionary linguists) and then discussed what kinds of evidence and lines of reasoning support or seem to go against these positions. Extreme position A, which basically is the Chomskyan position of Generative Grammar, holds that:
(1) There was a single biological mutation which (2) created a new unique cognitive domain, which then (3) immediately enabled the unlimited command of complex structures via the computational operation of merge. Further, according to this extreme position, (4) this domain is used primarily for advanced private thought and only derivatively for public communication and lastly (5) it was not promoted by natural selection.
On the other end of the spectrum there is extreme position B, which holds that:
(1) there were many cumulative mutations which (2) allowed the expanding interactions of pre-existing cognitive domains creating a new domain, which however is not characterized by principles unique to language. This then (3) gradually enabled the command of successively more complex structures. Also, on this view, this capacity was used primarily for public communication, and only derivatively for advanced private thought and was (5) promoted by natural selection.
Hurford then went on to discuss which of these individual points were more likely to capture what actually happened in the evolution of language. He first looked at the debate over the role of natural selection in the evolution of language. In Generative Grammar there is a biological neurological mechanism or computational apparatus, called Universal Grammar (UG) by Chomsky, which determines what languages human infants could possibly acquire. In former Generative Paradigms, like the Government & Binding Approach of the 1980s, UG was thought to be extremely complex. What was more, some of these factors and structures seemed extremely arbitrary. Thus, from this perspective, it seemed inconceivable that they could have been selected for by natural selection. This is illustrated quite nicely in a famous quote by David Lightfoot:
“Subjacency has many virtues, but I am not sure that it could have increased the chances of having fruitful sex (Lightfoot 1991: 69)”
However, with the rise of the minimalist programme (MP) in the 90s these arbitrary properties disappeared from mainstream Generative/MinimalistTheorizing. This means that in MP, Language isn’t that complicated, abstract and arbitrary as it once was. Instead, there is only one central property that is seen as characterizing the core linguistic system: The ability to combine elements via the operation of merge. If we follow this development, this means that Lightfoot’s problem goes away. Hurford argued that in addition, the ability to merge concepts in your head to form more complex conceptual representations obviously is adaptive in private thought so that from his perspective, natural selection now does play a role in this kind of account. 

The process of Externalization, that is the ability to merge meaning-form pairs into signs in order to express complex meanings in public communication is also obviously adaptive. The ability to use merge in thinking and communication is thus highly adaptive. So even within Generative theorizing, it seems as if natural selection should play a role in accounts of how language evolved. However, Chomsky himself, and many Generativist following him, still insists that natural selection plays no part in the evolution of language. Hurford criticizes this view by stating that a completely non-adaptationist view would predict that people without merge were not evolutionary disadvantaged, which clearly isn’t the case. Hurford then addressed the Competence – Performance distinction as used in Generative Grammar. In the Generative tradition competence refers to a tacit knowledge of the unlimited possibilities of a combinatorial capacity of the linguistic system. 

Quite obviously, accidental and temporary performance factors, e.g. distraction, drunkenness, or sudden death, do not factor into the underlying knowledge or linguistic competence. Such practical bounds are not relevant for a theory of competence. However, Hurford argues that performance is in fact relevant to determining what exactly competence is. Namely, there are also permanent limiting factors, like processing capacity, storage capacity or short term memory in conditions of alertness. These are not accidental and are just as ‘innate’ as any form of Language Acquisition device supposed by nativists. One example of this is complex birdsong, which is a very regular behaviour based on an innate template and environmental exemplars. 

That is, its underlying biological foundations seem to function in a very similar way to how language is thought to be organized by some. However, the template already has limiting factors built into it, like the regularity and numerical upper and lower bounds of the number of repetitions of phrases as well as the overall durations. The fact that these are already built means that in birds, it doesn’t make sense to speak of competence and performance independently of each other. The same, Hurford argues, goes for language. Hurford thus coined the term Competence+™, as representing a package of competence plus statistical ingredients and the kinds of permanent limiting factors like storage or processing capacity mentioned above. This then led Hurford to coin the term of UG+™ (Universal Grammar Plus™), which refers to the fact that on this view the formal properties attributed to Universal Grammar (i.e. the ‘language acquisition toolkit’ a child is born with), on the one hand, and memory and processing power, on the other, would not have evolved independently. Instead, memory and processing power are inherently numerically bounded. UG+™, then, represents the coevolved package of formal and numerical information. That is, it refers to the coevolution of form and behavioural dispositions. On this view, a child is born with UG+™ and then acquires or develops Competence+™. 

Hurford also criticized the position that the biological changes enabling languages primarily evolved for private thought, because this would imply that the first species in the Homo lineage that developed the capacity for unlimited combinatorial private thought (i.e. “merge”) were non-social and isolated clever hominids. This, as Hurford rightly points out, is quite unrealistic given everything we know about human evolution regarding, for example, competition, group size, neocortex side and tactical deception. There is in fact very strong evidence that what characterizes humans the most is the exact opposite as would be predicted by the “Merge developed in the service of enhancing private thought” position: We have the largest group size of any primate, the largest neocortex (which has been linked to the affordances of navigating a complex social world) and have the most pronounced capacity for tactical deception.

In terms of the timing of externalization and the evolution of merge there are two possibilities:

Externalization preceding Merge: On this view, even the simplest conceptual units were externalized from an early stage in hominid evolution onwards (confer Bickerton’s protolanguage). This means that merge would have been public from the start.

The other possibility is that the capacity to merge conceptual units for advanced thought precedes externalization and public communication. In normal humans it is important to note that complex thought and complex language go together. There are of course pathologies where they are dissociated but overall there is a lot of evidence that there is a correlation between verbal and noverbal IQ, that learning simple public labels modifies thought, especially in children, that bilinguals perform better in certain tasks, and that words can function as and aid to thought.
This suggests a less simple possibility: A coevolutionary spiral of successively more complex language and more complex thought. This also means there can’t have been only a single mutation: The grammatical system and the system supporting it (storage capacities, working memory, vocal manual skills, pragmatics, etc.) are highly interdependent. They all had to evolve in partnership. Hurford closed his talk by discussing the question whether evolution has produced a new unique domain. Hurford stresses that our evolved capacities for language have built on pre-existing capacities for, e.g.
  •  Hierarchical organization of behaviour
  • Semantic memory for facts storage
  • Fast routinization  of useful procedures
However, he holds that our language capacities go well beyond these pre-existing capacities, which seems for him indicates that evolution has in fact created a new unique domain. This goes against, for example Ray Jackendoff’s view, who holds that:
"So the conclusion is mixed: The wondrous recursive creativity in language is not as special as it is often claimed to be. Nevertheless language is a special system because of what is does and the particular structural materials it uses to do it" (Jackendoff 2007:  143, see also Hurford 2011: 510 ).
Beckner et al. (2009: 17), in their position paper on language as a complex adaptive system, go even further:
“[I]n a complex systems framework, language is viewed as an extension of numerous domain-general cognitive capacities such as shared attention, imitation, sequential learning, chunking, and categorization (Bybee, 1998b; Ellis, 1996). Language is emergent from ongoing human social interactions, and its structure is fundamentally molded by the preexisting cognitive abilities, processing idiosyncrasies and limitations, and general and specific conceptual circuitry of the human brain.”
According to them
“As soon as humans were able to string two words together, the potential for the development of grammar exists, with no further mechanisms other than sequential processing, categorization, conventionalization, and inference-making (Bybee, 1998b; Heine & Kuteva,2007).”
As a Cognitive Linguist I think that regarding this last point I agree more with Jackendoff and Beckner et al. than with Hurford, although this might also only be a terminology issue of how to define “new” or “unique.” I think it’s perfectly fine to say that the system supporting language becomes a specialized and unique domain due to the kinds of symbolic input it operates on, but many developmentalists would also stress that it is in fact not evolution which created this new unique domain, but ontogeny in a richly socio-interactive cultural setting or a “symbolic niche.” Saying that in normal modern language users’ there is a specialized system for language is quite compatible with Cognitive Approaches and the view of language as a complex adaptive system. However, as people like Elizabeth Bates or Anna Karmiloff-Smith have pointed out, a linguistic cognitive domain can emerge through multiple domain-general cognitive and processing factors in combination with dynamics of social interaction and actual language during a child’s individual development. So in this view it would not be evolution creating a new unique domain, but development, which is quite compatible with what we know about neural re-use:
“According to [theories of neural re-use], it is quite common for neural circuits established for one purpose to be exapted (exploited, recycled, redeployed) during evolution or normal development (my emphasis), and be put to different uses, often without losing their original functions. Neural reuse theories thus differ from the usual understanding of the role of neural plasticity (which is, after all, a kind of reuse) in brain organization along the following lines: According to neural reuse, circuits can continue to acquire new uses after an initial or original function is established; the acquisition of new uses need not involve unusual circumstances such as injury or loss of established function; and the acquisition of a new use need not involve (much) local change to circuit structure (e.g., it might involve only the establishment of functional connections to new neural partners)” (Anderson 2010)
In this perspective language was shaped by and adapted to the organization principles brain, and it is normal development and the connectivity patterns. Language, then, becomes more similar to other highly specialized neural systems like chess or driving (Karmiloff-Smith 1992). Thus, general cognitive capacities and constraints (e.g. constraints from the conceptual system, pragmatics, learning and processing mechanisms, perceptuo-motor factors and others, cf. Christiansen & Chater, 2008) and their interconnectivity might play a more crucial role than Hurford gives them credit for. As Michael Tomasello (2003: 284) argues:
“Everyone agrees that human beings can acquire a natural language only because they are biologically prepared to do so and only because they are exposed other people in the culture speak- ing a language. The difficult part is in specifying the exact nature of this biological preparation, including the exact nature of the cognitive and learning skills that children use during ontogeny to acquire competence with the language into which they are born.”
On this alternative view children have specialized capacities for intention-reading and pattern-finding, including general cognitive processes of cultural learning, a drive to communicate, shared intentionality, joint attentional capacities, schematization and analogy, symbolic processing, distributional analysis, entrenchment, and other cognitive mechanisms for constraining generalizations and language learning that not only apply to linguistic input. This view is advocated, for example, by usag usage-based (e.g. Michael Tomasello, Elena Lieven) cognitive-functional (e.g. Liz Bates), socio-cognitive (e.g. Eve Clark, Jerome Bruner) and emergentist (e.g. Brian MacWhinney) views of language acquisition, use, and processing,

The extent to which this architecture might also process other input is also a matter of debate. The CAS view for example predicts that:
 “Specifically, language will depend heavily on brain areas fundamentally linked to various types of conceptual understanding, the processing of social interactions, and pattern recognition and memory. It also predicts that so-called “language areas” should have more general, prelinguistic processing functions even in modern humans [...].” (Beckner et al. 2009: 18) 
So the jury is still out whether the interconnection and co-optation of domain-general processes alone can explain language acquisition and use, and this is a highly active and exciting area of research (see e.g. this paper published a couple of days ago in a special issue on "Pattern perception and computational complexity") that plays a fundamental role in answering the question of what is wrong, and what is right in language evolution research.

[cross-posted in a slightly modified version at Replicated Typo]

Sunday, September 9, 2012

Pleyer & Winters (2012): Integrating Cognitive Linguistics and Language Evolution Research

Today James Winters of Replicated Typo and I are giving a talk at the Poznań Linguistic Meeting (PLM) on “Integrating Cognitive Linguistics and Language Evolution Research.”  It’s a talk in a thematic section on “Theory and evidence in language evolution research”, which I hope to blog about a bit tomorrow. We'll come back to our talk later on and talk about it in a bit more detail but for the time being here’s our abstract:

Integrating Cognitive Linguistics and Language Evolution Research
Cognitive Linguistics is a school of modern linguistic theory and practice that sees language as an integral part of cognition and tries to explain linguistic phenomena with relation to general cognitive capacities (e.g. Evans 2012; Geeraerts & Cuyckens, 2007). In this talk, we argue that there is a wealth of relevant research and theorizing in Cognitive Linguistics that can make important contributions to the study of the evolution of language and cognition. This is in line with recent developments in the field, which have attempted to apply key insights from Cognitive Linguistics on the nature of language and its relation to cognition and culture to the question of language evolution and change (cf. e.g. Evans, 2012; Pleyer, 2012; Sinha, 2009; Tomasello, 2008)  
We illustrate this proposal with relation to the three timescales that have a bearing on explicating the structure and evolution of language (Kirby, 2012):
1.     The ontogenetic timescale of individuals acquiring language
2.     The glossogenetic timescale of historical language change
3.     The phylogenetic timescale of the evolution of the species
On the ontogenetic level, cognitive-functional and usage-based linguistic approaches investigate the importance of social, cultural, interactive and cognitive processes in language acquisition and learning (Beckner et al., 2009). In particular, they have demonstrated the crucial role that capacities and motivations for perspective-taking, shared intentionality, joint attention, as well as cognitive processes like analogy, statistical learning, generalization and entrenchment play in successfully acquiring and learning to use a language (e.g. Tomasello, 2003, 2008).
Through the repeated interaction between individuals we can observe regular patterns of change at the glossogenetic level. So, rather than simply appealing to historical contingency, diachronic language change is also dependent on biases and constraints that, through a continual cycle of innovation, amplification and fixation (Croft, 2000), are expressed as system-wide characteristics (Deacon, 2010: 124). Still, these are far from pre-determined paths, with the trajectories of change being much more similar than the resulting states (Beckner et al., 2009: 7). Such is the case in the well-attested process known as grammaticalization: “[a] subset of linguistic changes whereby lexical material in highly constrained pragmatic and morphosyntactic contexts becomes grammatical, and grammatical material becomes more grammatical […]” (Traugott, 1996: 183). Grammaticalization might therefore be considered a canalizing process: that is, it limits the search space in which variation is allowed to explore.
Importantly, these Cognitive-Linguistic elucidations of the cognitive processes involved in and necessary for language acquisition, transmission and change can also inform accounts of the phylogenetic evolution of language. Namely, they can do so by helping to specify the cognitive and representational capacities that had to evolve beyond those found in other animals in order to support language and the interactive and dynamic processes of meaning construction fundamental to linguistic interaction. It is clear these general cognitive mechanisms influence language change. Yet the extent to which they have shaped the evolution of language is something that is currently under explored. Kirby (in press), for instance, posited that the grammaticalization process might offer an explanation for the division of labour between contentive and functional items in the lexicon (Kirby, in press: 13).
As Cognitive Linguistics sees the complex adaptive system (Beckner et al., 2009; Winters, Tissari & Allan, 2010) of language as well as its evolution as relying on general cognitive capacities and factors, it also actively seeks to integrate converging evidence from other disciplines in cognitive science (Evans 2012). This feature of Cognitive Linguistics thus makes the discipline highly amenable to interdisciplinary integration and presents another reason why a synergetic dialogue between Cognitive Linguistics and language evolution research seems worthwhile. A crucial question, then, concerns the relative roles of cultural evolution and biological evolution in accounting for the underlying structural hallmarks of language. By showing how general cognitive capacities can interact with cultural evolutionary processes, we might be able to extrapolate from well-attested processes observed in historical language change to the evolution of language. Thus, in focusing on the role of general cognitive capacities and constraints from the conceptual system, pragmatics, learning and processing mechanisms, perceptuo-motor and other factors in determining language structure and usage (Christiansen & Chater, 2008), Cognitive Linguistics can make a significant contribution to the highly interdisciplinary study of language evolution.
In our talk, we will present case studies from the three timescales discussed above in order to illustrate that a further integration of Cognitive Linguistics and language evolution in the future indeed promises to be a highly fruitful enterprise. For instance, we will focus on the Cognitive-Linguistic notion of construal, which denotes the fact that language can be conceived of as a structured inventory of constructions which enable language users to encode a situation in many different ways and from multiple perspectives (Evans 2012; Pleyer 2012). This facility plays a central role in language use and acquisition and can also be shown to be highly important in explicating the complex adaptive system of language on the ontogenetic, glossogenetic, and phylogenetic level.
Beckner, C. et al. (2009). “Language is a complex adaptive system." Language Learning, 59(s1): 1-26.
Christiansen, M. H. & Chater, N. (2008). “Language as Shaped by the Brain” In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31: 489-509.
Deacon, T. (2010). “Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel's Hub.” In: Clayton, P. and Davies, P. (eds.). The Re-emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 111-150.
Evans, V. (2012). “Cognitive Linguistics.” In: Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science 3: 129-141.
Geeraerts, D., & Cuyckens, H. (eds.) (2007). The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Kirby, S. (2012): “Language is an Adaptive System: The Role of Cultural Evolution in the Origins of Structure.” In: M. Tallerman & K. R. Gibson (eds): The Oxford Handbook of Language Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 589-604.
Kirby. S. (in press). “The Evolution of Linguistic Replicators.” In: Smith, K. and Binder, P. (eds). The Language Phenomenon. Springer.
Pleyer, M. (2012). “Cognitive Construal, Mental Spaces and the Evolution of Language and Cognition.” In: T. C. Scott-Phillips, M. Tamariz, E. A. Cartmill und J. R. Hurford (eds.): The Evolution of Language. Proceedings of the 9th Conference on the Evolution of Language. Singapore: World Scientific, 288-295.
Sinha C. (2009). “Language as a biocultural niche and social institution.” In: New Directions in Cognitive Linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; 2009, 289–310.
Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Tomasello, M. (2008). The Origins of Human Communication. Cambridge, MA; London, England: MIT Press.
Winters, M.E., Tissari, H. & Allan, K. (2010). Historical Cognitive Linguistics. Mouton de Gruyter: Berlin.

Dirk Geeraerts: Corpus Evidence for Non-Modularity (Poznań Linguistic Meeting 2012 Plenary Talk)

The first plenary talk at this year’s Poznań Linguistic Meeting was by Dirk Geeraerts, who is professor of linguistics at the The first plenary talk at this year’s Poznań Linguistic Meeting was by Dirk Geeraerts, who is professor of linguistics at the University of Leuven, Belgium.

In his talk, he discussed the possibility that corpus studies could yield evidence against the supposed modularity of language and mind endorsed by, for example, Generative linguists (you can find the abstract here)

 Geeraerts began his talk by stating that there seems to be a paradigm shift in linguistics from an analysis of structure that is based on introspection to analyses of behaviour based on quantitative linguistic studies. More and more researchers are adopting quantified corpus-based analyses, which test hypotheses using statistical testing of language behaviour. As a data-set they use experimental data or large corpora. In his talk, he discussed the possibility that corpus studies could yield evidence against the supposed modularity of language and mind endorsed by, for example, Generative linguists (you can find the abstract here


One further trend Geeraerts identified in this paradigm shift is that these kinds of analyses become more and more multifactorial in that they include multiple different factors which are both internal and external to language. Importantly, this way of doing linguistics is fundamentally different than the mainstream late 20th century view of linguistics. What is important to note here when comparing this trend to other approaches to studying language is that multifactoriality goes against Chomsky’s idea of grammar as an ideal mental system that can be studied through introspection. In the traditional view, it is supposed that there is some kind of ideal language system which everyone has access to. This line of reasoning then justifies introspection as a method of studying the whole system of language and making valid generalizations about it. However, this goes against the emerging corpus linguistic view of language. On this view a random speaker is not representative for the linguistic community as a whole. The linguistic system is not homogenous across all speakers, and therefore introspection doesn’t suffice. 


The main thrust of Geeraerts' talk was that research within this emerging paradigm also might call into question the assumption of the modularity of the mind (as advocated, for example by Jerry Fodor or Neil Smith): The view of the mind as a compartmentalized system consisting of discrete components or modules (for example, the visual system, language) plus a central processor.

Saturday, March 10, 2012

Evolang Preview: Cognitive Construal, Mental Spaces, and the Evolution of Language and Cognition

Evolang is busy this year - 4 parallel sessions and over 50 posters. We'll be positing a series of previews to help you decide what to go and see. If you'd like to post a preview of your work, get in touch and we'll give you a guest slot.
Michael Pleyer Cognitive Construal, Mental Spaces, and the Evolution of Language and Cognition Poster Session 1, 17:20-19:20, "Hall" (2F), 14th March  
Perspective-taking and -setting in language, cognition and interaction is crucial to the creation of meaning and to how people share knowledge and experiences. As I’ve already written about on this blog (e.g. hereherehere), it probably also played an important part in the story of how human language and cognition came to be. In my poster presentation I argue that a particular school of linguistic thought, Cognitive Linguistics (e.g. Croft & Cruse 2004Evans & Green 2006Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007Ungerer & Schmid 2006), has quite a lot to say about the structure and cognitive foundations of perspective-taking and -setting in language.

Therefore an interdisciplinary dialogue between Cognitive Linguistics and research on the evolution of language might prove highly profitable. To illustrate this point, I offer an example of one potential candidate for such an interdisciplinary dialogue, so-called Blending Theory (e.g. Fauconnier & Turner 2002), which, I argue,  can serve as a useful model for the kind of representational apparatus that needed to evolve in the human lineage to support linguistic interaction. In this post I will not say much about Blending Theory (go see my poster for that ;-) or browse here ), but I want to  elaborate a bit on Cognitive Linguistics and why it is a promising school of thought for language evolution research, something which I also elaborate on in my proceedings paper. So what is Cognitive Linguistics?Evans & Green (2006: 50), define Cognitive Linguistics as
“the study of language in a way that is compatible with what is known about the human mind, treating language as reflecting and revealing the mind.”
Cognitive Linguistics sees language as tightly integrated with human cognition. What is more, a core assumption of Cognitive Linguistics is that principles inherent in language can be seen as instantiations of more general principles of human cognition. This means that language is seen as drawing on mechanisms and principles that are not language-specific but general to cognition, like conceptualisation, categorization, entrenchment, routinization, and so forth.
From the point of view of the speaker, the most important function of language is that it expresses conceptualizations, i.e. mental representations. From the point of view of the hearer, linguistic utterances then serve as prompts for the dynamic construction of a mental representation. Crucially, this process of constructing a mental representation is fundamentally tied to human cognition and our knowledge of the world around us.

As Gilles Fauconnier (2004: 658) notes:

“Language is only the tip of a spectacular cognitive  iceberg,  and  when  we  engage  in  any  language  activity,  we  draw unconsciously  on  vast  cognitive  and  cultural  resources,  call  up  innumerable models  and  frames,  set  up  multiple  connections,  coordinate  large  arrays  of information, and engage in creative mappings, transfers, and elaborations.”
Now what is especially important about linguistic interaction are the following properties of language: Linguistic utterances
  • organize conceptual content with respect to a particular vantage point and perspective
  • construe the world in a specific way
  • embody a particular perspective onto it (cf. Geeraerts 2006)
  • serve as prompts for the allocation of attention to a particular aspect of the cognitive representation evoked in the listener (cf. Talmy 2007)
As "your theory of language evolution depends on your theory of language" (Jackendoff 2010), the following aspects of Cognitive Linguistics seem to be most important to evolutionary accounts of language:
  1. the emphasis CL puts on the conceptual, interactive, symbolic and perspectival dimension of language and
  2. the concept of cognitive construal operations, which are seen as one of the most important aspects involved in language use and understanding.
Construal operations refer to the specific ways in which a language can portray events and states of affairs from certain perspectives. They include things like expressing different viewing frames on a situation (e.g. "The train goes from Norwich to Peterborough” static and focusing on the whole journey vs. “The train is going from Norwich to Peterborough” dynamic, and only focussing on part of the journey vs. “); construing things at different levels of granularity (animals vs. mammal vs dog vs pug vs black pug vs Rico), spatial perspective (“e.g. “We are going to your party” with the speaker being the ‘deictic centre’ vs. “I’m coming to your party” with the hearer being the “deictic centre” towards who the movement is directed); degrees of involvement or subjectivity/objectivity in a situation (e.g. “the team are really looking forward to the derby” vs. “me and my mates are really looking forward to the derby”) words to denote different aspects of a situation (e.g.: ‘cost,’ ‘charge,’ ‘spend,’ ‘pay,’ ‘sell,’, ‘buy’ for a commercial transaction), and so forth (cf. Radden & Dirven 2007).

And it is this perspectival nature of language that might be most relevant from an evolutionary point of view:

 How and when did the capacity (or set of capacities) evolve that allowed us to communicate and share our perspective on things and co-construct a joint perspective on topics?
From a CL point of view, two things are important here: the specific of construal operations of any invididual language certainly have evolved through cultural transmission (cf. Heine & Kuteva 2007Christiansen & Chater 2008; Kirby 2012, see also here).  But  all construal operations are thought to be instantiations of and to rely on general cognitive capacities. These basic cognitive abilities include, for example, assigning prominence to certain foregrounded aspects of a conceptualization while backgrounding othersdeveloping a shared point of view and taking different perspectives on the same topic.
While some Cognitive Linguists think the story ends here, I share the view that we need empirical and psychological work as well as evolutionary considerations to spell out in more detail what these grounding cognitive capacities look likehow they work and how they support language (cf. e.g. Gonzáles-Márquzez et al. 2007). Because from the perspective of Cognitive Linguistics, these are some of the most important questions that need to be addressed in tackling the evolution of language and cognition.

 [cross-posted at Replicated Typo]

Wednesday, February 1, 2012

The first ever song about Language Evolution & Recursion

Over at replicated typo, Sean has recorded what very likely is the first song ever about language evolution: "You'll never teach a monkey how to sing" Go and listen to it, it's fantastic!

On a slightly more scientific note, James also discusses the latest work on Pirahã and the question whether it has recursion or not.

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

Animal Cognition & Consciousness (II): Metacognition & Mentalizing

As I wrote in my last post, three kinds of behaviours are most often discussed in debates about animal consciousness and cognition:
“1. Mirror self-recognition
2. Tests of metacognition;
3. Metacognition of others’ mental states” (Gómez 2009: 45)
After having discussed the first capacitiy in my previous post, I will discuss the latter two in this post, starting with metacognition, that is being aware of one’s own knowledge states, and then turn to being aware of other’s mental states.


Being aware of one’s own mental states, i.e., reflective consciousness, surely seems to be one of the most crucial components of self-awareness. In one paradigm used to test for metacognitive awareness, monkeys were trained to select, out of a number of two or more images, the one that is identical to an image they have been shown earlier. As is to expected, the monkeys’ performance progressively deteriorated the longer the delay was between the sample image and the selection task.