Showing posts sorted by relevance for query "frame of reference". Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query "frame of reference". Sort by date Show all posts

Friday, July 17, 2009

Language, Thought, and Space (III)



In the second chapter of his book, Stephen Levinson discusses a concept that has been crucial to this blog: frames of reference. (see e.g. these posts) The term as it is used today was coined by Gestalt theorists of perception in the 1920s and was used to signify the steady and constant background against which other objects could be made out and identified. It can be defined as “‘a unit or organization of units that collectively serve to identify a coordinate system with respect to which certain properties of objects, including the phenomenal self, are gauged’ (Rock 1992: 404, emphasis in Levinson 2003: 24).

Frames of references seem to be highly similar across modalities such as vision, touch, gesture, and language. Without these structural similarities (or ‘isomorphisms’) “we could not reach to what we see, or talk about what we feel with our hands, or give route descriptions in language and gesture.” (Levinson 2003: 25). There are, however, also differences: vision is viewer-centred, and touch and grasp are object-centred.

In general, frames of references can be classified by the following distinctions.
Absolute vs. Relative. Psychologically, the received view is that we organize our spatial thinking in relation to objects and ourselves. The frame of reference is thus relative to our own ego-centric bodily coordinates. An absolute frame of reference, on the other hand would consist of fixed angles with coordinates that do not depend on our personal egos as anchoring. And as we have seen, contrary to the received view, both kinds of frames of references are employed in the world’s languages. (Levinson 2003: 27f.).
Similar, but not completely identical is the differentiation between egocentric and allocentric frames of reference. This designates a difference
"between coordinate systems with origins within the subjective body frame of the organism, versus coordinate systems centred elsewhere (often unspecified).” (Levinson 2003: 28).

Our mental maps of our environment and our place are either egocentric or allocentric and landmark-based, including the relations, distances and angles between different landmarks, or allocentric and based on “fixed bearings.” These distinctions can not only be found in the world’s languages, but are also used by neuroscientists when they look at the mental map-building capacities of animals.
In studies of conceptual development it was also argued, following Jean Piaget, that for a long time ‘egocentric’ frames of reference are primary and that children switched to ego-centric frames of reference only to a much later date.

In studies of the visual system we often find a distinction between viewer-centred vs. object-centred. If we identify an object we are also able to mentally rotate it and imagine how it would look from another angle. This means that the retinal impression of the viewer gets interpreted and classified in a more abstract object-centred frame of reference during perception.
Another distinction made when looking at visual imagery and visual perception is that between orientation-bound vs. orientation-free. Orientation-bound information changes with perspective and change of location, whereas orientation-free information does not change. For example, when we rotate a d it can become a b, the information changes. But a ball looks the same from all perspectives and the information is thus orientation-free.
The most important distinction for psychology and language however, is the difference between
“viewer-centred frames, object-centred frames, and environment-centred frames of reference.Ina viewer-centred frame, objects are represented in a retinocentric, head-centric or body-centric coordinate system based on the perceiver’s perspective of the world. In an object-centred frame, objects are coded with respect to their intrinsic axes. In an environment-centred frame, objects are represented with respect to salient features of the environment, such as gravity or prominent visual landmarks. “ (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin 1993: 224).
Levinson called these the relative, intrinsict and absolute frames of reference. (Levinson 2003: 33).

The distinctions made in various disciplines at times are quite confusing and there are many conflicting positions. However, a broad differentation such as this seems valid.
Next, we have to distinguish between three levels on which different frames of references can be constructed: perceptual, conceptual, and linguistic. There is especially much diversity on the linguistic level, which will be discussed in my next post. As I'm going home tomorrow I don't really know when I'll have access to the internet again, but I hope it wont't be too long.

Reference:
Carlson-Radvansky, L.A. and Irwin, D.A. (1993): Frames of reference in vision language: Where is above? Cognition
46: 223-244

Levinson, Stephen C. (2003) Space in Language and Cognition : Explorations in Cognitive Diversity. West Nyack, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Rock, I. (1990), The frame of reference, in I. Rock (ed.), The legacy of Soloman Asch, pp. 243– 268. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Thursday, July 16, 2009

Language, Thought, and Space (II)

Spatial orientation is crucial when we try to navigate the world around us. It is a fundamental domain of human experience and depends on a wide array of cognitive capacities and integrated neural subsystems. What is most important for spatial cognition however, are the frames of references we use to locate and classify ourselves, others, objects, and events.

Often, we define a landmark (say ourselves, or a tree, or the telly) and then define an object's location in relation to this landmark. (the mouse is to my right, the bike lies left of the tree, my keys have fallen behind the telly). But as it turns out, many languages are not able to express a coordinate system with the meaning of the English expression “left of.” Instead, they employ a compass-like system of orientation.

They do not use a relative frame of reference, like in the English “the cat is behind the truck” but instead use an absolute frame of reference that can be illustrated in English by sentences such as “the cat is north of the truck.” (Levinson 2003: 3). This may seem exotic for us, but for many languages it is the dominant – although often not the only – way of locating things in space.

What are the cognitive consequences of this? Levinson argues that “
the choice of a predominant frame of reference in language correlates with, and probably determines, many other aspects of cognition, from memory, to inference, to navigation, to gesture and beyond. “ (Levinson 2003: 3).

Levinson has done much work on two languages which feature absolute frames of references:
1. Guugu Yimithirr, an Australian Aboriginal language. Levinson recounts how a Guugu Yimithirr speaker once warned him of an army ant “north of his” foot, or how another one told him where to find the frozen fish in a store that was 45 kilometres away. He pointed to his left and Levinson, just as all speakers of Indo-European and many other languages would probably do, thought he meant that Levinson would find the frozen fish on his right-hand side when he entered the shop. But in fact, he had pointed north-east and intended to communicate to Levinson that he would find the frozen fish in the north-east corner of the shop.

Größere Kartenansicht

2. Tzeltal, a Mayan language. In Tzeltal, speakers use the hills that surround them as points of reference. If they are out of the hills, they still project their frame of reference on their environment. So a speaker asking “Is the hot water in the uphill tap?” in an unfamiliar hotel out of the hills would mean by this ‘Is the hot water in the tap that would lie in the uphill (southerly) direction if I were at home?’ (Levinson 2003: 4).

Größere Kartenansicht

Levinson was particularly impressed by a Guugu Yimithirr speaker who, when referring to a absent person, seemingly pointed at himself but in fact pointed to the place the person had lived before. For Levinson, this indicates that
“in some striking way, the ego has been reduced to an abstract point in space. (Levinson 2003: 5)”

These experiences fit perfectly into and are supported by a more thorough and experimental investigation of this matter. But they fly in the face of much of traditional western thinking on the topic, including the consensus on the nature of spatial thinking in much of cognitive science, psychology, and linguistics which held that it was organized in a relative, egocentric and anthropocentric manner. (Levinson 2003: 10f.).

And in the chapters of his book Levinson sums up a robust body of data that lend support to his thesis that spatial cognition may be differently organised in different cultures, and that the body may not be the fundamental source of our spatial concepts, neither developmentally nor cross-culturally.

However, there are still strong universal trends in cognition in the domain of space. According to Levinson the best way to accommodate all these findings is to concede that human cognition may employ several modes of internal representation and that there is no reason to assume that there is only one form of mental representation. If we accept this view, it seems much more logical to state that the internal representations accessed by and linked to language and cultural practices are in some way influenced and shaped by these linkages. (Levinson 2003: 21f.).
Levinson sums up the key issues that recur throughout his book as follows:

  • “What are the ‘natural’, pre-linguistic or innate, spatial concepts in human cognition? How abstract are they? Why does spatial thinking have a centrality in human cognition?
  • What is the role of bodily axes and coordinates in spatial cognition?
  • What is the nature of the relation between linguistic categories and non-linguistic concepts, both in general and in the spatial domain? Are there a multiplicity of underlying representations, or one multimodal representation of space? If the latter, what is its relation to spatial semantics?
  • How much linguistic diversity is there in this domain, not only in expressive form, but underlying semantic parameters? Given that there is diversity, what linguistic universals can be stated in this area?
  • Given semantic diversity, what happens to the underlying cognition? Does it remain a universal constant, translated into various restricted linguistic concepts, or does it adapt to the language it must locally support?
  • What are the general implications from the spatial domain for the relation between language and human thinking?” (Levinson 2003: 22f.)

References:

Levinson, Stephen C. (2003) Space in Language and Cognition : Explorations in Cognitive Diversity. West Nyack, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Thursday, April 24, 2008

Perspectives on “Perspective” – Part I

Since in my previous posts on the phenomenon of perspective - i.e. the fact that we tend to view and (re)present thoughts and states of facts in the world in highly specifiy, perspectival ways, - I have mainly focused on the work of German linguist Wilhelm Köller and his (2004) book “Perspektivität und Sprache” (Perspectivity and Language) and how his thoughts relate to those of other linguists, developmental psychologists, cognitive scientists, etc., I wanted to represent more fully the work of some scholars whose work also focuses on the notion of perspective.

Scholars who make important contributions under the heading of perspective or perspectivity include, for example.:

- developmental and comparative psychologists Michael Tomasello and Henrike Moll from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology,

- psychologist Carl F. Graumann, former Professor of Psychology at Heidelberg University, who died in 2007

- linguist Brian MacWhinney, Professor of Psychology at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA

- developmental psychologist Josef Perner of the University of Salzburg, Austria

- cognitive linguist Ronald Langacker, professor emeritus at the University of California, San Diego.

- cognitive linguist Leonard Talmy, Professor Emeritus of Linguistics at the University at Buffalo, State University of New York


But in order to get a more comprehensive view of the phenomenon of perspective in general, let’s first untangle the various forms of inquiry into the whole range of phenomena that can be subsumed under the heading of perspective.

Basically, we can look at perspective from various points of views, which of course, have to be integrated for a full grasp of the notion of perspective. For example:

1. Perspective from a developmental/ontogenetic point of view

From a developmental perspective we can ask when and how children come to be able to take the viewpoint of another person, first visually (Level 1, perspective taking, e.g. Flavell 1988, Moll & Tomasello 2006), then on a mental level of “putting oneself in the cognitive shoes of someone else” (Tomasello 1999). More generally we can ask, how Children become able to grasp not only that an object looks different from a different point of view, but also how the object might look like from a certain perspective (Level 2, perspective-taking, Flavell 1988).

In this regard it’s of special interest that perspective taking is a social-cognitive skill, and thus to look at children’s perspective taking and setting in cooperative and interactive situations. On a later stage of development, it’s a major research issue how children come to construe a “Theory of Mind” which allows them to attribute mental states to others, and to include these attributions in their predictions and thus also their interactions with other people.

This ability may reflect a full understanding of the concept of perspective, allowing children to compare differing perspectives on a phenomenon and to select amongst competing perspectives (Perner et al. 2002).

It is also likely that the development of an concept of self crucially depends on our interactions with others (Mead 1934), and especially on the child’s developing ability to understand perspectives. This allows her to contrast various views of the world and to understand herself by adopting other people’s perspective on herself, thus learning to see herself through the eyes of others. She also learns to see herself from different temporal perspectives and episodes, and to integrate these different perspectives into a unified view of herself as a person (Moll 2007)

2. Perspective from an Evolutionary/Comparative point of view

From an evolutionary perspective, we can look at how the ability to take and set perspective arose in the phylogenetic history of our species, and on which evolutionary foundations this ability was built. We can thus pose the same questions we asked in regard to children for the role-taking abilities of chimpanzees and other non-human primates (for a review see Tomasello et al. 2005).

Another key issue is the question which role cooperative behaviors with shared goals and intentions, which essentially depend on the notion of perspective, played in the cultural as well as evolutionary history .

Blending this area of research with the former one, we can also assess whether the unique perspectival qualities of human cognition and human interaction lead to special forms of perspectival cognitive representation in ontogenetic development (Moll & Tomasello 2007)

This is of course deeply related to the question how our lineage came to display this diverse set of modern human behaviors, symbolic and otherwise, such as language and especially the ability to understand others as intentional mental agents, which is the foundation of “cumulative” cultural evolution, innovation and shared artifacts, symbols, and institutions (Tomasello et al. 2005, Sterelny 2003). Tomasello et al.(2005) propose that it is the evolution of “shared intentionality”, i.e. the ability to jointly attend to a situation and to

"participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions.” (Tomasello et al. 2005: 675),
was the major stepping stone in the evolution of behaviorally modern humans.

In accordance with th Tomasello et al’s (2005) and Moll & Tomasello’s (2007) hypothesis that this ability is linked to the evolution of uniquely human forms of perspectival mental representations, Benoît Dubreuil (2008) also challenges the role of language as being the driving force behind behavioral modernity, and instead proposes that the key “

"cognitive mechanism behind modern sapiens behavior is one of the general mechanisms underlying the higher form of ToM: the ability to hold in mind a stable representation of conflicting perspectives on objects”
and that this change is especially salient in human evolution by 85,000BP. His main argument is that there is no evidence that the production of the archaeological artefacts that appear around that time, for example, engraved ochres or marine shell beads, presupposes any symbolic abilities of their producers.This is because
"from an archaeological perspective, there is no real way to tell aesthetic and symbolic functions apart.“
But what they definitely entail is that their makers knew that the object they are making looks good from various viewpoints, and especially, in the case of self-decoration, that it makes the wearer look good from someone else’s perspective.

3. Perspective from a cognitive point of view

Perspective is implicated in all forms of cognition in various ways. For starters, there is the fact of embodiment, i.e. the fact that “minds have bodies that are situated in environments” (Poirier et al. 2005: 741). This means, that all perception is essentially of a perspectival nature dependent on how our minds are ‘grounded’ in various kinds of interactions with other physical processes (e.g. Barsalou 2008). Perspective thus refers to the way we categorize and represent the world. All cognition is therefore point of view dependent, or to be more precise, dependent on the frame of reference in which we transport “the parts of an object or the elements of a complex state of affairs and their interrelations” (Graumann 2002: 25). We can thus unify diverging perspectives, construe various perspectives simultaneously, and mentally manipulate them in the domain of our frame of reference, or cognitive coordinate system (see for example Bischof-Köhler & Köhler 2007) We can thus “project” ourselves into various frames of reference. Essentially these perspectives can also be “decoupled” (Sterelny 2003) from our immediate surroundings, and we can mentally travel through time and imagine ourselves in past, future, and hypothetical situations.

Interestingly, neuroscientific evidence points toward the assumption that Thinking about the future, episodic remembering, conceiving the perspective of others (theory of mind) and navigation” engage the same cortical network, “which suggests that they share similar reliance on internal modes of cognition and on brain systems that enable perception of alternative vantage points.” (Buckner & Carrol 2007). Although the authors of this study prefer the term ‘self-projection’, we could also construe these abilities as drawing on the core principle of understanding and taking perspectives.

These observations lend support to the idea that to understand perspectives, we make use of a single representational format, namely a basic frame of reference, as systemic space or coordinate system in which we construe and into which we transport conceptual representations. This idea is further supported by the neuroscientific evidence that

“simulated actions in the first and in the third person perspectives share common representations” (Anquetil & Jeannerod 2007)
i.e. that they work on the same representation, which can be used from different perspectives via a changing Origo- or Viewpoint (Bühler 1934) within the frame of reference.

Another question is the nature of the concepts employed in categorizing and cognizing the world around us. There are indicators that concepts, just like linguistic symbols, are of an essentially perspectival nature, with a specific ‘highlighting-and-hiding pattern’ (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). If we take Lawrence W. Barsalou’s view of concepts as internally simulated perceptual traces, with abstract concepts “grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. (Barsalou 1999), perspective also plays a central role in the constitution and online activation of concepts and, as we will see, also the interpretation of complex events via metaphorical mappings.

That’s it for now. In my next post I will write a bit about perspective from the viewpoint of cognitive linguistics and philosophy.

On a related note, the latest edition of the Four Stone Hearth is out. Go have a look!

References:

Barsalou, Lawrence W. (1999): Perceptual Symbol Systems. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22.4, 577-609.

Barsalou, Lawrence W (2008): Grounded Cognition. In: Annual Review of Psychology 59, 617-645.

Bischof-Köhler, Doris & [My paper]Norbert Bischof (2007): Is mental time travel a frame-of-reference issue? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):316-7

Buckner, RL & DC Carroll (2007): Self-projection and the brain. In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11.2Bühler, Karl (1934): Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. Jena: Gustav Fischer.

Dubreuil, Benoît (2008): What do modern behaviours in Homo sapiens imply for the evolution of language, in A. D. M. Smith, K. Smith, and R. Ferrer i Cancho (eds.), The Evolution of Language. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference (Evolang 7), World Scientific, 99-106.

Flavell, John H. (1988): The Development of Children’s Knowledge about the Mind: From Cognitive Connections to Mental Representations. In: Janet W. Astington, Paul L. Harris und David R. Olson (eds.): Developing Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 141-172.

Graumann, Carl F. (2002): Explicit and Implicit Perspectivity. In: Carl F. Graumann und Werner Kallmeyer (Eds): Perspective and Perspectivation in Discourse. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 25-40.

Köller, Wilhelm. 2004. Perspektivität und Sprache. Zur Struktur von Objektivierungsformen in Bildern, im Denken und in der Sprache. Berlin/ New York: de Gruyter.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mead, George Herbert. (1934) Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Moll, Henrike (2007): Person und Perspektivität – Kooperation und soziale Kognition beim Menschen. In F. Kannetzky & H. Tegtmeyer (Eds.), Leipziger Schriften zur Philosophie. Personalität – Studien zu einem Schlüsselbegriff der Philosophie, 37-56. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag.

Moll, Henrike und Michael Tomasello (2006): Level 1 Perspective-Taking at 24 Months of Age. In: British Journal of Developmental Psychology 24, 603-613.

Moll, Henrike, & Michael Tomasello. 2007. Co-operation and human cognition: The Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 362: 639-648.

Perner, J., Stummer, S., Sprung, M., & Doherty, M. (2002). Theory of mind finds its Piagetian perspective: Why alternative naming comes with understanding belief. Cognitive Development, 17, 1451-1472.

Poirier, Pierre, Benoit Hardy-Vallée and Jean-Frédéric Depasquale.2005. “Embodied Categorization.” In: Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science. Eds. Henri Cohen and Claire Lefebvre. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005.

Sterelny, Kim (2003): Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition. Malden: Blackwell.

Tomasello, Michael (1999): The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press.

Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 675– 735.

Saturday, August 15, 2009

Language, Thought, and Space (V): Comparing Different Species

As I’ve talked about in my last posts, different cultures employ different coordinate systems or Frames of References (FoR) "which serve to specify the directional relationships between objects in space, in reference to a shared referential anchor” (Haun et al. 2006: 17568) when talking about space. As shown in my last post these linguistic differences boil down to certain cognitive differences.
Whether speakers mainly use a relative, ego-based FoR, a cardinal-direction/or landmark-based absolute FoR, or an object-based, intrinsic based FoR, also influences how they solve and conceptualise spatial tasks.

In my last post I posed the question whether there is a cognitive “default setting” that we and the other great apes inherited from our last common ancestor that is only later overridden by cultural factors – and, crucially, which Frame of Reference is might be the default one?


Haun et al. (2006: 16570) argue that
"there has been a great deal of speculation about the inherited structure of spatial relational thought. Immanuel Kant argued that the human body provides the source of our basic intuitions about the nature of space. In agreement, many cognitive scientists hold the assumption that spatial cognition is fundamentally egocentric [references omitted].”
In the same vein, Dirven et al. (2007: 1213), point out that
“The principle of corporeal deixis [i.e. body-based or body-centric spatial reference] is even so self-evident that it has been considered by most linguists, including cognitive linguists, as the default case, if not the universal one (Talmy 1983).”
I myself also thought this way and found Karl Bühler’s (1934) notion of the ego-based “Here-Now-I”-origo quite self-evident. In Bühler’s view, this deictic centre is the origin of a “coordinate system of subjective orientation,” which builds the basis and referential anchoring for all communicative acts and all social interaction and coordination,

However, we can still see the egocentric frame of reference as the universal default case and see absolute frames of reference as being cultural variations that transform our innate frame of reference. This would thus still be in line with the paradigm mentioned above as well as with developmental psychologist Jean Piaget’s central assumption that in cognitive development infants start with an egocentric perspective on the world and only later learns to coordinate multiple perspectives on the world.

To test whether this is really the case, Haun et al. used a similar but simplified setting like in their first experiment that I described in my last post, and tested gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and 4-year-old German children.

This time there were only 3 identical cups on the table so the object-centred and the geocentric conditions from the previous experiment were collapsed.
The subject was first shown where a reward is hidden
(X = Cups | = Screen E= Experimenter O=Hidden Object)
and was then rotated 180° and brought to an identical table behind the screen where they could then again locate the reward.

In the Relative condition the reward was in relation to the subject. If it was hidden to his left on table 1 it was also hidden to his left on table 2 :
In the Absolute condition “the hiding and finding cups maintained position Relative to the larger, surrounding environment” and also to “a salient landmark between the two tables, namely the screen or the experimenter” (Haun et al. 2006 : 17569).
It turned out that the great apes including the 4-year old children deployed an allocentric/environment-based layout more readily than an ego/self-based spatial strategy. At the very least, these data indicate that
“Despite common expectations, [...] Hominid spatial cognition is at least not always primarily egocentric“ (Haun et al. 2006: 15751).
To further corroborate this evidence, Haun et al. 2006 tried an even simpler version of this task on the non-human great apes as they are known to have problems with abstract rule-learning and generally scored quite low on the second experiment.

Thus, in a third experiment, the subjects were directed to the first table and in the baseline condition were rewarded for picking a cup no matter which it was for 10 times. The animals were then led to the table that was on the other side of the screen and the experimenter started to only reward one of the cups until the apes consistently picked a particular cup ten out of twelve times in a row. If they had succeeded in doing so, they were redirected to the original table and in the test trials were again rewarded for all of their ten choices.
In this way, the experimenters induced a “response” or “training bias” in the apes: In the test condition they tended to preferably pick the same cup as the one for which they were rewarded 10 times in a row in the training condition. That is, if they were rewarded for picking the middle cup in the training session, they also preferred to pick the middle cup when rotated 180° and brought back to the original table in the test condition.



The interesting question then is: If they were rewarded for picking say this cup:

in the training condition: which cup would they show the response bias for in the test condition? Would they interpret this as being ‘the cup to their left’? Or would they interpret it as being allocentrically/environmentally based?
As in the second experiment, great apes showed a preference for environmental cues as opposed to self-based cues. That is if they developed a preference for the cup in the upper illustration, they then preferred to pick the following cup in the rotated test condition.
Haun et al. (2006: 17572) conclude that gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and we all have inherited “preference for allocentric spatial strategies” from our shared ancestor.

“Based on this result, we argue that, at least for small-scale spatial relations, the inherited cognitive mode of operation is not, as argued by Kant and others, egocentric but preferably deploys environmental cues as common reference between object.”
I think this is a fascinating result and I find the argument very convincing. It is also strengthened by findings from cognitive and linguistic development: By 16 months, when they have become successful mobile navigators, children competently use non-egocentric cognitive strategies. 3- to 5-year old English-speaking children even appear to be “better at allocentric strategies than at egocentric ones.” Moreover, in cultures where an absolute frame of reference is the dominant one, children master “this system as early as 4 and certainly by 7 years of age.” Children who live in cultures that dominantly employ a relative frame of reference, on the other hand, do not seem to master the full use of a left and right system until about 11 years of age. (Haun et al. 17572).

At first sight, this might seem like quite a blow for embodiment theories in Cognitive Science and Cognitive Linguistics who see embodied, egocentric experience as our primary way of making sense of the world.
But as Dirven et al. (2007) point out, “given the universality of human bodily experience,” it would not be “astonishing” if corporeal deixis constituted “the default case” of spatial cognition,
“but as a more refined conception of embodiment, the notion of situated embodiment incorporates and integrates man’s physical and social environment in his or her holistic bodily experience” (Dirven et al. 2007: 1217).


References:

Bühler, Karl. 1982. Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. Stuttgart,
New York: Fischer (Uni-Taschenbücher 1159).

Dirven, René, Hans-Georg Wolf, and Frank Polzenhagen. 2007. “Cognitive Linguistics and Cultural Studies.” In: The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, ed. by Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1203-1221.

Haun, Daniel B. M., Christian J. Rapold, Josep Call, Gabriele Janzen, and Stephen C. Levinson. 2006. “Cognitive Cladistics and Cultural Override in Hominid Spatial Cognition.” In: PNAS 103: 17568–17573.

Levinson, Stephen C. 2003. Space in Language and Cognition: Explorations in Cognitive Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levinson, Stephen C., Sotaro Kita, Daniel B.M. Haun, Björn H. Rasch. 2002. “Returning the Tables: Language Affects Spatial Reasoning.” In: Cognition 84: 155–188.

Palmer, Gary B. 2007. “Cognitive Linguistics and Anthropological Linguistics.” In: The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, ed. by Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1045-1073.

Pederson, Eric. 2007. “Cognitive Linguistics and Linguistic Relativity.” In: The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, ed. by Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1012-1044.

Talmy, Leonard. 1983. “How Language Structures Space.” In: Spatial Orientation: Theory, Research and Application. ed. by Herbert L. Pick, Jr., and Linda P. Acredolo. New York: Plenum Books. 225–82.

Friday, August 14, 2009

Language, Thought, and Space: (IV) Comparing Different Cultures.

I wanted to continue posting on Stephen Levinson’s 2003 book, but unfortunately, I only have very limited access to the internet right now, and as my year abroad at the University of Nottingham is over, I don’t have access to the e-book version anymore (The Library at the University of Heidelberg has a copy of the book but I’m currently at home and can’t get it from there either).

Instead, I’ll post about a fascinating study done by people from the Max-Planck-Institute for Psycholinguistics (Nijmegen, Netherlands) and people from the Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (Leipzig, Germany) that pretty much blew me away (quite literally so: it pretty much destroyed a central assumption of the received theory of cognitive perspective that I wanted to work on).

As I already said, work done by Stephen Levinson and others on how different cultures talk about and conceptualise space has shown that not all of them employ a bodily, egocentric frame of reference or coordinate system as their dominant organizing principle for their experiences and thoughts. Speakers of “several indigenous languages of Australia, Papua New Guinea, Mexico, Nepal, and south West Africa,” in contrast, organize the axes of their dominant coordinate system by absolute principles such as fixed landmarks (e.g. uphill vs. downhill) or cardinal directions (e.g. move the chair to the north). In addition, there are also languages that primarily use “intrinsic,” object-centred Frames of References, such as in “The dog is at the front of the library.”
In a set of clever experiments Levinson and his colleagues have also shown that speakers of relative and absolute languages differ in how they solve non-linguistic spatial tasks. For example, in the “motion-maze task” (Pederson & Schmitt 1993) participants see a toy move on a table. They are then rotated 180° and asked to recognize, on a table with a maze-like diagram, the “the path traversed from within a maze-like diagram containing both absolute and relative possibilities“ (Levinson et al. 2002).

Interestingly, speakers of relative languages such as Dutch or Japanese recognize the path based on the relative frame of reference they employ in their language whereas speakers of absolute languages such as the Australian Aboriginal language Arrernte or Tzeltal recognize the path based on their absolute frame of reference (Levinson et al. 2002, Levinson 2003).
Results like this were achieved on a wide array of space-based tasks, so the overall findings that relative speakers prefer relative FoR in spatial tasks and that absolute speakers prefer absolute FoRs seems to be quite robust. (Haun et al. 2006).
In a recent set of experiments Haun et al. (2006) tested how soon a cognitive bias in spatial cognition manifests itself. They tested 7-11 age year old children from a Dutch village, who mainly use an egocentric FoR) and from a Khoisan hunter–gatherer community in Namibia called =/= Akhoe Hai||om (to be honest, I don’t have any idea how to pronounce this), who almost always use absolute spatial descriptions.
They also tested adults of both cultures “to see whether differences were not only initial variations of an emerging cognitive skill but were actually stable across the life span.”
What they did was the following: The subject was placed in front of a table on which there were five identical cups in a “five dice”-constellation:
(X = Cups | = Screen E= Experimenter O=Hidden Object)




They were then shown the location of an object that was hidden under one of the cups.



In the next step, the Subject was turned 180° and brought to an identical table behind the screen:

Then, and this is the crucial bit, they were asked to indicate the spot where they thought the object was hidden this time. In the experiment, there were three conditions. First, an egocentric one: if the object was hidden to the left of the subject, it was also hidden to the subject’s left after she was rotated to her new position.



Secondly, there was an object-centred condition in which the “hiding and finding cups maintained position in relation to a salient landmark between the two tables, namely the screen or the experimenter” (Haun et al. 2006 : 17659).



And finally, there was a geocentric condition where, if the hiding cup was to the north-west, it would also be the to the north-west in the rotated position.


After repeated trials on all the conditions the following picture emerged: Hai||om children and adults were faster to learn and made the fewest errors in the absolute condition and Dutch children and adults were best in the egocentric condition.
“This correlation is fully robust by age 8 and persists into adulthood. In sum, Dutch and Hai||om subjects varied in their preferred cognitive strategy to solve a spatial relational learning task, and their preference matched the preferred mode of description in their respective language” (Haun et al. 2006 : 17570).

Although it is quite difficult to interpret these results in terms of the relationship between language and thought (see e.g. Pederson 2007, Palmer 2007: 1059ff.), the results are certainly thrilling and give rise to a further question: which of these frames of reference is the primary and basic one that infants have? Is there a cognitive default setting that we and the other great apes inherited from our last common ancestor which is only later overridden by cultural factors?
I’ll return to this question in my next post tomorrow.

References:

Haun, Daniel B. M., Christian J. Rapold, Josep Call, Gabriele Janzen, and Stephen C. Levinson. 2006. “Cognitive Cladistics and Cultural Override in Hominid Spatial Cognition.” In: PNAS 103: 17568–17573.

Levinson, Stephen C. 2003. Space in Language and Cognition: Explorations in Cognitive Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levinson, Stephen C., Sotaro Kita, Daniel B.M. Haun, Björn H. Rasch. 2002. “Returning the Tables: Language Affects Spatial Reasoning.” In: Cognition 84: 155–188.

Palmer, Gary B. 2007. “Cognitive Linguistics and Anthropological Linguistics.” In: The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, ed. by Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1045-1073.

Pederson, Eric. 2007. “Cognitive Linguistics and Linguistic Relativity.” In: The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, ed. by Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1012-1044.

Pederson, Eric & B. Schmitt 1993. Eric’s maze task. In Cognition and Space Kit Version 1.0 (pp. 73–76).Nijmegen: Cognitive Anthropology Research Group at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics.

Thursday, January 31, 2008

Metal Representation in the Brain

Before I start with my ‘background check’ for what we need for the creation and maintenance of a shared perspectival systemic space, I want to address two core issues of perspectivity. I already alluded to the first issue in this posts title, which is an amusing typo to be found on page 92 of Talmy Givón's (2005) book "Context as Other Minds: The Pragmatics of Sociality, Cognition and Communication"

1. Mental Representations

The first issues is largely an epistemic one. In a speculative account of what might have happened evolutionary so that we have the ability to entertain cognitive perspective, I would begin like this:

  1. The first necessary component for perspective is the ability to form mental representations, i.e. internal representations of outside reality.

The evolution from reactive systems not ‘having internal perspective’ (NIP) to systems ‘having internal perspective’, i.e. systems that are able to predict and, later on, even plan future events based on internal models of reality, can be seen as the first step from cognitive to non-cognitive organisms. (Cruse 2003)

Some authors, such as Ray Jackendoff, are unhappy with the term ‘mental representation.’ In Jackendoff (2007: 5-7), for example, he argues that we should discard the term ‘mental representation’ and instead speak of ‘mental structures’. His argument is that, from an epistemological point of view, we cannot say that some neuronal activity represents a state in the world, i.e. is ‘about’ something in the real world (what philosophers call, ‘aboutness’ or ‘Intentionality’). Also, he argues, ‘representation’ would imply that there is actually someone perceiving or interpreting these mental structures. But the mental functions of the ‘mind/brain’ bear only an indirect relation to the ‘real world’, mediated by long chains of neuronal connections and neurons interacting with each other. Mental capacities and the ‘real world’ are on this and on the opposite ends of a long chain of indirect, limited and intertwined neuronal interactions.

But I think it is important that at this point we are still talking “Beanbag Semantics” (Dennett 2003, Dennett 1995): Nowadays we know, for example, that the relation between single genes and the actual phenotypic traits an organism develops is not as easy as Mendelian beanbag genetics, but is in fact incredibly complex and depends on a variety of factors. Yet in some contexts it still makes sense for a biologist to speak of a ‘gene for x’, which then only implies that there seems to be a causal connections between to things, which can later be investigated more closely. Whereas in biology we by now have a pretty good idea how genes work, we still don’t really have a clue what ‘mental representations’ or ‘mental structures’ actually are, how they work, and how they are implemented in the brain. We are still at the ‘beanbag’ level, so to speak, and thus it seems perfectly alright to attribute ‘mental representations’ until we have found more about how this process actually works.

“There is, then, nothing wrong with using a term like ‘mental representation’ to label an entity whose physical properties we are only beginning to understand" (Cheney & Seyfarth 2007: 240)

So of course even if I follow Bühler and Köller in my notation of the “origo of the deictic sphere” /systemic space as a two-dimensional graph,


it is important to note that this conceptualization is above all a “‘metaphor’ for individual systems of orientation” (Bredel 2002: 176, Graumann 1994: 61)

2. The Objective Rationality of Perspectives

Another fascinating facet of any approach to perspectivity is the question of how rational decisions are grounded in the perspectives and of an individual and result in perspectival actions and choices.

To be more precise. On the one hand the frame of reference of an individual is one of the most basic parts of her perspective (Bischof-Köhler 2000, Bischof-Köhler & Bischof 2007) On the other hand, we can construe individuals a rational agents who try to act according to their “Natural Rationality”, based on multiple interacting processes of decision-making, trying to act as rational as possible given their precise perspective and choices, acting on clearly calculated incentives.

In this fascinating Blogginheads discussion, Tim Harford presents his new book “The Logic of Life: The Rational Economics of an Irrational World”, in which he argues that even when a prostitute agrees to have sex without a condom, or someone starts smoking, these decisions are based on rational calculation, given the current perspective of these economically acting agents.

Similarly, Benoit Hardy-Vallée, on his cool blog Natural Rationality, regularly posts on decision-making in humans and non-human animals, based on the theoretical assumption that natural selection is a powerful player able to implement rational decision making strategies in organisms, and that many irrational-seeming decisions are based on calculations which seem perfectly rational from the agent’s present perspective. Hardy-Vallée cites Dan Gilbert’s work on affective forecasting as an example of this tendency to base rational decisions on faulty information. In this case, our predictions are imperfect because we are unable to predict our own future psychological states correctly. This happens because we often simulate future events based on memories that don’t represent the past only inaccurately. These memories are ‘essentialized’, only containing the core features of past events, and are abbreviate,

“which means that mental simulations tend to overrepresent the moments that evoke the most intense pleasure or pain.” (Gilbert & Wilson 2007: 1353)

The TED-Website features a very entertaining talk by Dan Gilbert on his research on our flawed prospective system.

Now we can add another important factor to the study of perspectivity: A rational agent able to consider multiple overlapping frames of reference, who is able to adopt multiple perspectives on a situation, is clearly at an advantage when it comes to making decisions.

A virtual systemic space thus is a key property of our ability to make advanced rational decisions, even if these still seem to be seriously flawed in some respects.

So it seems that shared systemic spaces do not only enable us to communicate, cooperate and share intentions about these mental representations. Neither do they only enable us to form mental models of reality and basing our predictions on these models by taking the physical, design, or intentional stance towards certain referents in these internal models.

On a more general level, in the optimal condition they enable us to base our decisions on our natural multiperspectival rationality.

As I have to start studying for my exams, I'm afraid that I'll have to pause my inquiry into the cognitive properties of perspective for a short time. In the next two weeks, I'll return to a matter I'm a bit more familiar with: The Evolution of Language, which of course also has many converging point with the study of the ontogenetic and phylogenetic rise of perspective. I'll follow the example of the Language Evolution Blog and post about some people or papers holding - I think - interesting or important views on this topic.

References:

Bischof-Köhler, Doris. 2000. Kinder auf Zeitreise: Theory of Mind, Zeitverständnis und Handlungsorganisation. Bern et al.: Hans Huber.

Bischof-Köhler, Doris & Norbert Bischof . 2007. Is Mental Time Travel a Frame of Reference Issue? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30.3: 316-317.

Bredel, Ursula. 2002. “You can say you to yourself.” Establishing Perspectives with Personal Pronouns. In: Carl F.Graumann & Werner Kallmeyer (Eds.): Perspective and Perspectivation in Discourse. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 167-180.

Cheney, Dorothy L. and Robert M. Seyfarth. 2007. Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Cruse, Holk. 2003. The Evolution of Cognition – A Hypothesis. Cognitive Science 27
2003: 135–155

Dennett, Daniel C. 1995. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Dennett, Daniel C. 2003. Beyond Beanbag Semantics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26.6 673-674.

Gilbert, Daniel. T., & Wilson, Timothy D. (2007). Prospection: Experiencing the Future. Science 317, 1351-1354.


Givón, Talmy. 2005. Context as Other Minds: The Pragmatics of Sociality, Cognition and Communication. John Benjamins.

Graumann, Carl F. 1994. Wieviel Zeigen steckt im Nennen? Zur Situiertheit des Sprachgebrauchs. In: H.J. Kornadt, J. Gabrowski, & R. Mangold-Allwinn (Eds.) Sprache und Kognition. Perspektiven moderner Sprachpsychologie. Heidelberg: Spektrum. 55-69.

Jackendoff, Ray. 2007. Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on mental Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT.


Monday, November 3, 2008

Proof of Life and some thoughts on human uniqueness

In the next few days I’ll be getting a new laptop and then I’ll finally have access to the internet again. I will try posting on a weekly basis about things going on the blogosphere and about my own attempts at writing my (or rather something equivalent to) my M.A. Thesis.

Right now, I’m reading Marc Hauser’s (2001) “Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think” and Michael Tomasello’s (2003) “Constructing A Language” but I managed to buy Tomasello’s new book, The Origins of Human Communication, have followed Edmund Blair Bolles’ multi-part review with much interest, and when I’m done with the two other books I’ll start with Tomasello’s new one.

As Sandy G. of The Mouse Trap I’m especially interested in Tomasello’s idea of shared intentionality as it unfolds in a joint attentional frame in a rich social interactional setting. But what I am interested in is fleshing out the kind of perspectival cognitive representations that allows us to navigate successfully in social, linguistic, as well as spatial settings.

Apparently, Tomasello again only hints at how such a system might look like, but I share the hunch is that that it has something to do with Bühlerian “coordinate system awareness” and the ability to locate yourself and others in a dynamic shared frame of reference (see also the interesting work of Stephen Levinson)

An abstract frame of reference also seems to be a key issue for our ability of “higher order, abstract, role-governed, relational reasoning” which, according to Penn et al. 2008 (see also here and here) s the core system responsible for setting human cognition apart from the cognitive systems of other animals.

Povinelli et al.’s explanation that the cognitive discontinuity between human and nonhuman cognition arises from our ability of “relational reinterpretation”, i.e. the ability to reinterpret and encode perceptually-based experiences in an abstract and symbolic fashion, still sounds pretty good to me. But their claim rests on the assumption that nonhuman animals aren’t able to build up representations of more abstract frames of references at all, but that that their behaviour can be explained in terms of reinforcement history and perceptually-based strategies, and the evidence cited by them is clearly in favour of their view.

But in Marc Hauser’s 2001 book I’ve read about Clark’s Nutcracker, a food storing bird that can hide up to 33,000 seeds in more than six thousand locations and is able to retrieve most of them months later. Hauser reports on experiments done by Alan Kamil and Juli Jones, who trained the birds to at a point in the middle of two landmarks. After that, the experimenters varied the distance between the landmarks, and the tested Clark’s nutcrackers were successful in generalizing the location of the food to the new geometric situation and retrieved it successfully at the new midway point. Hauser concludes that “these data show that nutcrackers form a representation of the geometric relationship among landmarks – something like the middle – and use this to find stored food” (Hauser 2001: 89).

To me this looks like an instance of relational reinterpretation, reinterpreting the specific perceptually-based spatial location of two landmarks in terms of a higher-order abstract geometrical system, but I would be very interested what other people think about this experiment.


References:

Penn, Derek C, Keith J. Holyoak. and Daniel J. Povinelli (2008): Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (31:2): 109-130.

Monday, May 25, 2009

Six Candidates for What Makes Human Cognition Uniquely Human


One of the key candidates for what makes human cognition unique is of course language and symbolic thought. We are “the articulate Mammal” (Aitchison 1998) and an “animal symbolicum” (Cassirer 2006: 31). And if one defining feature truly fits our nature, it is that we are the “symbolic species” (Deacon 1998). But as evolutionary anthropologists Michael Tomasello and his colleagues argue, “saying that only humans have language is like saying that only humans build skyscrapers, when the fact is that only humans (among primates) build freestanding shelters at all” (Tomasello et al. 2005: 690).



Language and Social Cognition

According to them and many other researchers, language and symbolic behaviour, although they certainly are crucial features of human cognition, are derived from human beings’ unique capacities in the social domain. As Willard van Orman Quine pointed out, language is essential a “social art” (Quine 1960: ix). Specifically, it builds on the foundations of infants’ capacities for joint attention, intention-reading, and cultural learning (Tomasello 2003: 58). Linguistic communication, in this view, is essentially a form of joint action rooted in common ground between speaker and hearer (Clark 1996: 3 & 12), in which they make “mutually manifest” relevant changes in their cognitive environment (Sperber & Wilson 1995). This is the precondition for the establishment and (co-)construction of symbolic spaces of meaning and shared perspectives (Graumann 2002, Verhagen 2007: 53f.). These abilities, then, had to evolve prior to language, however great language’s effect on cognition may be in general (Carruthers 2002), and if we look for the origins and defining features of human uniqueness we should probably look in the social domain first.

Corroborating evidence for this view comes from comparisons of brain size among primates. Firstly, there are significant positive correlations between group size and primate neocortex size (Dunbar & Shultz 2007). Secondly, there is also a positive correlation between technological innovation and tool use – which are both facilitated by social learning – on the one hand and brain size on the other (Reader and Laland 2002). Our brain, it seems, is essential a “social brain” that evolved to cope with the affordances of a primate social world that frequently got more complex (Dunbar & Shultz 2007, Lewin 2005: 220f.). Thus, “although innovation, tool use, and technological invention may have played a crucial role in the evolution of ape and human brains, these skills were probably built upon mental computations that had their origins and foundations in social interactions” (Cheney & Seyfarth 2007: 283).


Language, Mental Representations, and Symbolic Thought


But this of course does not mean that we expect all other unique aspects of human cognition to be derivative of social cognition. The development of higher social cognition only presented the enabling context and cognitive starting point for other human mental capacities to evolve. To pick up the example again, language, for instance, does not only have an interactive function but also a symbolic one. It creates ‘symbolic assemblies’ that function as form-meaning pairings (Evans & Green 2006: 6f.). But the ability to acquire arbitrary symbolic units itself does not appear to be uniquely human, as it has been demonstrated in great apes, parrots, dolphins and dogs (see Tomasello 2008: 254ff.). But there are two essential differences between the symbolic abilities of humans and other animals: First, even with lexigram- or sign language-trained apes there appears to be nothing that even comes close to the production and joint engagement skills possessed by human children (production) or even pre-verbal infants (joint engagement) (Tomasello 2008: 109ff.).

Secondly, human symbols and concepts function as ‘decoupled representations’ which are not directly bound to a reaction pattern as in most other animal species, including symbol-trained animals, and enable significant “response breadth” and planning (Sterelny 2003: 29f.). In addition, symbolic thought and linguistic usage does not only rely on the comprehension and production of arbitrary signs, but essentially depends on our capacity for abstract, relational, analogical, higher-order, hierarchical and role-governed compositional thought. (Deacon 1998, Jackendoff 2007, Penn et al. 2008).


We now have two tentative candidates for what makes us special:

(1) The capacity to develop a shared point of view or “we-perspective” (Tuomela 2007: 46f.) and jointly engage in and attend to shared goals, plans and intentions in a cooperative collaborative activity within a joint attentional frame and a shared frame of reference (Tomasello et al. 2005).

(2) A conceptual system that is able to reinterpret and re-describe sensory as well as cognitive data and store them in an abstract, decoupled format that can be used for symbolic, relational and analogical reasoning (Penn et al. 2008).

We can now imagine a step in evolution where these two capacities were further integrated, yielding the analogical realization that others are “like me” (the capacity developed to

(3) actively attribute mental states to others in the same sense as one experience mental events and states oneself, that is to, have a “theory of mind” (Premack & Woodruff 1978).

Further, an integration of these capacities, and continuing collaborations and mutual engagements in social and other activities, would lead to the emergence of

(4) shared, intersubjectively overlapping frames of references or coordinate systems into which abstract and non-abstract conceptual representations could be integrated and imported in a systematic fashion, and within which shared percepts and concepts could be blended, unified, and related to each other in a role-governed fashion. (Bühler 1934, Fauconnier & Turner 2002).

In short, the first species in the hominin line who developed this capacity would not only have shared a perceptual world with his or her conspecifics, but they would inhabit a shared mental world. In this collective “we-perspective” and shared frame of reference mediated by joint engagement, they would then be able to create a shared “symbolic niche” in which meaningful cultural practices and shared symbolic constructs, such as institutions, could be co-created and which would ‘come alive’ and have actual real-world significance (Harder fc, Tuomela 2007). By jointly attending to and attaching meaning to cultural artefacts and practices homo gave them intersubjective value and reality and created ‘institutional realities’ (Searle 1995, Moll & Tomasello 2007). It is probable that from the dawn of human culture cognition accelerated in a spiralling and cumulative cognition-culture feedback loop

Additionally, when we are able to project ourselves and others into the same frame of reference, and can also project more abstract symbolic units into this coordinate system, it follows that along and co-evolving with these other changes a capacity

(5) for projecting ourselves and others backwards or forwards into past and future situations is probable to have evolved, that is, a capacity for mental time travel, including the ability to retrieve and re-live episodic memories of past autobiographical events (Tulving 2005) as well as prospective foresight enabling the planning of future actions and events (Suddendorf & Corballis 2007).

Finally, these changes were certainly accompanied co-evolutionary by a means of externalising shared proto-concepts and communicatively coordinating cooperative activities in a flexible manner via the vocal and gestural level. (Hurford 2007, Tomasello 2008). At some time, concepts became public, that is “they became the sorts of things that lots of people can, and do, share” (Fodor 1998: 28).

It is conceivable that “building upon pre-existing representational schemes in animals” (Hurford 2007: 140), and a general perceptual and cognitive machinery that scaffolded them (Jackendoff 2007: 388), ever increasing linguistic abilities and concepts evolved step by step. They probably did evolve from the proto-concepts we can see in the higher mammals of today into the pre-linguistic concepts that are argued to exist in some of the other great apes (especially those individuals who are enculturated and symbol-trained) and then into some form of proto-language (Bickerton 2009). At some time, this proto-language with already quite sophisticated conceptual representations then evolved into the fully human language we know today.

In summary, a truly human language faculty evolved, which is

(6) a collection of unique mental structures – phonology (externalisation) and syntax (merging constituents (A + B = [AB] and creating blended new ‘mental building blocks’ which can be merged with other constituents recursively [AB] + C = [ABC]) – and the interfaces between these mental structures and the conceptual system. These “specific unique building blocks for phonology, syntax, and their connection to concepts” are what makes language and language acquisition possible (Jackendoff 2007: 388f.).


This account of course has not mentioned important ecological factors (e.g. navigation, foraging, predator avoidance) that will have contributed to these developments and constructed niches in which these factors could develop further and faster. In the case of language, for example both “fast processing and mapping from hierarchical structure to temporal ordering,” which are two fundamentally important features of human language, “can be attributed to progresses in the timing of actions necessary for producing and using hand axes, [as well as throwing] that is, to sensomotoric skills that could have been adapted for language” (Wunderlich 2006). Support for this thesis comes from the fact that PET scans have shown a that there is neural circuitry supporting and involved in both language production and early stone age tool-making (Stout et al. 2008, see also here).

It also fits with our general model that there is mounting evidence “that much temporally sequenced hierarchical structure is constructed by the same part of the brain […] whether the material being assembled is language, dance, hand movements, or music (Jackendoff 2007: 388). Additional work on mirror neurons, motor neurons that activate both when an action is performed and observed (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004), points in the direction that they are involved in understanding the goal-related actions of others in a social context. The evolution of a Mirror Neuron System for understanding actions and intentions may have been a crucial part of the cognitive development that made human thinking possible.

This is also supported by the fact that the human conceptual system has two distinctive properties: One the one hand it enables abstract, relational, role-governed, symbolic thinking (Penn et al. 2008). But at the same time human concepts are still deeply rooted in, based on, and grounded in embodied sensori-motor experience (Barsalou 1999, Gallese & Lakoff 2005). This holds even for linguistic concepts and metaphors, which have been shown to be partly grounded in embodied cognition (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). To get back to language, a final indicator of the connectedness of social interaction and parts of higher-order cognition comes from proposals that “neural circuits doing computations to control the hierarchy of goal-related actions were ‘exploited’ to serve the newly acquired function of language syntax” (Gallese 2007: 666).

Now that we have some theoretical proposals on crucial aspects of human uniqueness (although this list is far from being definitive and exclusive), we can see in how far they are borne out by the comparative and developmental data that is available.


References:

Aitchison, Jean. 1998. The Articulate Mammal. An Introduction to Psycholinguistics. London / New York: Routledge.


Barsalou, Lawrence W. 1999. “Perceptual Symbol Systems.” Behavioral and Brain Scienes 22.4: 577–609.


Bickerton, Derek (2009): Adams Tongue: How Humans Made Language. How Language Made Humans. New York: Hill and Wang.


Bühler, Karl (1934): Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. Stuttgart: Fischer.


Carruthers, Peter (2002), The cognitive functions of language, in: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25 (6),

657–726


Cassirer, Ernst (2006): An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. Hrsg. v. Maureen Lukay. Hamburg: Meiner (Gesammelte Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe. Band 23).


Cheney, Dorothy L. and Robert M. Seyfarth. (2007) Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


Clark, Herbert (1996): Use of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Deacon, Terrence William (1997). The Symbolic Species. The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain. New York / London: W.W. Norton.


Dunbar, R. I. M. and Susanne Shultz. (2007)“Evolution in the Social Brain” Science 317: 1344-1347


Evans, Vyvyan and Melanie Green (2006): Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.


Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner (2002) The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities. New York: Basic Books.


Fodor, Jerry A. (1998) Concepts. Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford Congitive Science Series. Oxford: Clarendon.


Gallese, Vittorio (2007). Before and below 'theory of mind': Embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):659-669


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Jackendoff, Ray (2007): Linguistics in Cognitive Science: The State of the Art, The Linguistic Review 24, 347-401.


Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson (1980) Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Lewin, Roger (2005): Human Evolution: An Illustrated Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.


Moll, Henrike, & Michael Tomasello. (2007) Co-operation and human cognition: The Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 362: 639-648.


Penn, Derek C, Keith J. Holyoak. and Daniel J. Povinelli (2008): Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (31:2): 109-130.


Premack, David und Guy Woodruff (1978): Does the Chimpanzee have a

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Sterelny, Kim (2003): Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition. Malden u.a.: Blackwell.


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Tomasello, Michael (2003): Constructing A Language. A Usage-Based Approach. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press.


Tomasello, Michael (2008): The Origins of Human Communication. Cambridge, MA; London, England: MIT Press.


Tomasello, Michael, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne, and Henrike Moll (2005): Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28:5, 675–691


Tuomela, Raimo (2007): The Philosophy of Sociality: From A Shared Point of View.

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Quine, Willard van Orman (1960): Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


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